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STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j)

1
RULES

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)

1

IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs medical negligence
claims on summary judgment when she admitted that she had pre-existing injuries to her
shoulder, she alleged that medical malpractice caused injury to her shoulder, and she did
not retain any experts to support her claims.
Standard of Review: The Court f,review[s] the district court's grant of a motion for
summary judgment for correctness." Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008
UT 55, Tf 12, 192 P.3d 858. Rule 56 (c) provides that judgment "shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Although the Court considers the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, any alleged issue of fact must be material.
Overstock.com, Inc., 2008 UT 55, f 12.
Preservation of Issue: The issue involved in this appeal stems from the trial court's
decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants on November 7, 2009. (R. 440445.)

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Midge Morgan ("Morgan") filed an action against Interaiountain Health Care Inc.

and LDS Hospital (collectively the "Hospital") on October 20, 2005. (R. 1-16.) In the
Complaint, Morgan alleges that she suffered shoulder injuries as a result of the care she
received from Rebecca Davis, RN, ("Nurse Davis") on February 27, 2003 while she was
recovering from cervical spine surgery at the Hospital. (Id.) Specifically, Morgan alleges
that the rotator cuff in both of her shoulders was damaged when Nurse Davis attempted to
assist her to the bathroom. (Id.)
Significantly, Morgan had a long history of shoulder problems before she was
admitted to the Hospital on February 26, 2003. Moreover, she complained of problems
with her shoulders before her surgery, while she was in the recovery room and on the
nursing unit before Nurse Davis became involved in her care. (R. 203-210, 425; Morgan
Add. 3 - 2, 12, 18, 22.) Morgan has never disputed that she suffered from pre-existing
shoulder problems. (R. 441-442.)
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court

During discovery, Morgan failed to identify an expert witness to testify about the
standard of care a nurse must follow when moving a patient recovering from spinal
surgery, but more importantly, she did not identify an expert witness who could support
the causation element of her case. (R. 440-445.) On the other hand, the Hospital
identified Kathleen Baldwin, RN, MSN, PhD. ("Nurse Baldwin"), an experienced
2

surgical nurse and Bruce Evans, MD ("Dr. Evans"), an orthopedic surgeon certified by
the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery. (R. 130-132.)
In an affidavit, Nurse Baldwin opines that Nurse Davis fully met the standard of
care. (R. 402-405.) Also, Dr. Evans opines that, based on his review of the medical
records, radiology films and deposition testimony, neither Nurse Davis nor any LDS
Hospital employee caused Ms. Morgan's alleged shoulder injuries or current shoulder
problems. (R. 424-427.) Specifically, Dr. Evans states that Morgan's shoulder problems
pre-existed her admission to LDS Hospital. (R. 425.) Dr. Evans expounds by stating that
it is hard to imagine how Nurse Davis could tear both rotator cuffs at the same time as
Morgan claims. (Id.) Further, the mechanism or way in which Morgan alleges the injury
occurred is inconsistent with the type of injury she claims. (R. 426.) Finally, Dr. Evans
opined that "Morgan's age and medical history are entirely consistent with the natural
sequence of how rotator cuffs are commonly torn." (Id.)
On June 19, 2009, the Hospital moved the trial court to dismiss Morgan's Complaint
because, without expert testimony, she could not prove the standard of care applicable to
the Hospital, breach of the standard of care, or that any such breach caused Morgan's
injury. (R. 192.) After considering the briefing by the parties with respect to the Motion
for Summary Judgment, the trial court dismissed Morgan's claims against the Hospital.
(R. 440-445.) The trial court noted that while Morgan claims that she does not need
expert testimony to prove her claims against the Hospital, she never disputed her previous
shoulder injuries. (R. 442.) As a result, relying on Fox v. Brigham Young University,
3

Inc., 2007 UT App 406, 176 P.3d 446, the trial court ruled that "lay testimony is not
sufficient to explain whether [Morgan's] injuries were the result of a previous injury and
surgery or the act of a nurse." (R. 443-444.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
A.

Morgan has a long history of shoulder problems.

While Morgan claims in her Complaint that she "had no previous injuries, damages
or defects in either shoulder prior to February 26, 2003," when she was recovering from
cervical spine surgery (R. 4), the medical record and her deposition testimony reveal that
this is not true. Morgan had shoulder surgery when her right shoulder was previously
dislocated. (R. 203-204.) Morgan told her doctor in 2001 that she still suffered from pain
in her right shoulder as a result of this surgery. (R. 207-208; Morgan Add. 3 - 122.)
Morgan also described pain in her shoulders following the automobile accident that led to
her back surgery. (R. 205-206; see also Morgan Add. 3 - 2.) When Morgan applied for
PIP benefits in June 1998, she noted that she had shoulder pain. (R. 206.) During her
deposition, Morgan also explained that she may have suffered a fall and was kicked by a
1

In her statement of facts, Morgan has included immaterial testimony. As a result,
the Hospital has not specifically addressed every allegation raised in Morgan's brief. Even
though the Hospital has not addressed every immaterial fact raised by Morgan, the Hospital
does not concede the veracity of the facts set forth by Morgan, especially Morgan's version
of the events with respect to the care she received from Nurse Davis.
2

While Morgan included medical records with the addendum to her brief that were
not included in the record and that were never submitted to the trial court, these records only
corroborate the material facts before the trial court set forth in deposition testimony and
affidavit. Also, contrary to Morgan's assertions, these medical records show Morgan's
history of shoulder problems. {See, e.g., Morgan Add. 3 - 2 , 12, 18, 22.)
4

horse before she underwent back surgery at the Hospital. (R. 209-210.)
More importantly, when Morgan was admitted to the Hospital on February 26, 2003
for her back surgery, she complained of pain in her shoulders before surgery and
continued to complain of shoulder pain in the recovery room immediately following
surgery, (R. 425.) Additionally, she complained of bilateral shoulder pain when she was
first admitted to the nursing floor. (Id; Morgan Add. 3 - 22.)
B.

Morgan's shoulder problems preexisted her alleged encounter with
Nurse Davis.

Dr. Evans, a physician practicing medicine in the State of Utah who is certified by
the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery, was asked to offer an opinion as to whether
Nurse Davis, or any other employee of the Hospital caused or contributed to Morgan's
alleged shoulder injury. (R. 394.) Specifically, Dr. Evans was asked whether Nurse
Davis caused the injuries of Morgan when she attempted to assist Morgan to the
bathroom. (Id.) After reviewing the medical record, radiology films and deposition
testimony, it is Dr. Evans' opinion, based upon his education, training and experience, that
neither Nurse Davis nor any Hospital employee caused Morgan's alleged shoulder
injuries. (Id.) Specifically, it is his opinion that Morgan's shoulder problems pre-existed
her admission to the Hospital (Id.)
C.

The manner in which Morgan claims that her injury occurred is
inconsistent with the type of injury she alleges.

In his Affidavit, Dr. Evans opines:
[I]t is hard to imagine that both rotator cuffs could be torn at the same time.
5

In short, the alleged mechanism in which Morgan claims that her shoulders
were injured is not consistent with her injury. Rotator cuff tearing is most
commonly associated with a deceleration injury which did not happen [in]
the manner Ms. Morgan described.
(R. 425-426.) Dr. Evan also explains:
Further, Ms. Morgan's age and medical history are entirely consistent with
the natural sequence of how rotator cuffs are commonly torn. For example,
over time, the medical record indicates that Ms. Morgan developed neck
problems and bone spurs. Her neck problems were likely caused by the
motor vehicle accident she was involved in 1998. When her neck became
painful, the large shoulder musculature became weaker due to nerve
compromise. The rotator cuffs in her shoulders naturally had to work harder
to compensate, leading to a thicker tendon or tendonitis from overuse. Once
thickened they came in contact with the acromium which caused
impingement and inflammation, all of which resulted in loss of blood supply
and degenerative tearing of her rotator cuffs.
(R. 426) In summary, Dr. Evans concludes, "[I]t is my opinion to a reasonable degree of
medical probability that the incident described in Ms. Morgan's Complaint did not cause
or contribute to her alleged injury or current medical condition." {Id.) Moreover,
Morgan's treating physician have not opined, to a reasonable degree of medical
probability, that any action on the part of the hospital caused or contributed to Morgan's
alleged injury.
D.

The knowledge necessary to position, move and transport postoperative cervical spine patients, such as Morgan, is not possessed by
the ordinary layperson.

Nurse Baldwin is a registered nurse with a doctorate degree in nursing. (R. 392.)
Nurse Baldwin was asked by counsel for the Hospital to review Morgan's medical records
and deposition testimony pertinent to this case and to offer an opinion as to whether the
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nurses who cared for Morgan during her stay at the Hospital met the standard of care.
(Id.) In reponse, Nurse Baldwin offered an opinion that the actions of Nurse Davis met
the standard of care when she attempted to help Morgan to the bathroom on February 27,
2003. (R.393.)
Further, as a registered nurse and nursing educator, Nurse Baldwin is familiar with
the standard of care applicable to nurses caring for patients recovering from cervical spine
surgery. (Id.) Nurse Baldwin also possesses knowledge of the special skills and training
nurses receive in order to properly move and transport such patients. (Id.) In fact, part of
the nursing curriculum and a significant part of the fundamentals course at Nurse
Baldwin's university involve teaching student nurses to properly position, move and
transport patients in acute care settings. (Id.) According to Nurse Baldwin, the skills
required to position, move and transport post-operative cervical spine patients, such as
Morgan, are not within the common knowledge of a lay person. (Id.) For that reason,
family members and friends are advised not to perform such duties. (Id.)
E.

Nurse Davis acted in compliance with the orders issued by Morgan's
doctor.

When Nurse Davis attempted to help Morgan move to the bathroom, she was acting
in compliance with orders from Morgan's treating physician. Morgan's treating physician,
Steven Warner, M.D., had written an order on February 26, 2003 that Morgan could move
without restrictions, and on February 27, 2003, he wrote an order that Morgan should
meet with a physical therapist. (R. 422, 423.) The medical records show that on February
7

26, 2003, Morgan's doctor ordered "activity: Ad Lib" after her surgery, which means
Morgan had no restriction in her activity. (R. 422; see also Morgan Add. 3 - 20.) Also,
the next day, February 27, 2003, the day Morgan alleges she was injured by Nurse Davis,
Dr. Warner ordered the nurse caring for Morgan to mobilize her for a consultation with a
physical therapist. (R. 423; Morgan Add. 3-21.) After reviewing the record, Nurse
Baldwin feels that it was entirely appropriate, given Morgan's condition and given the
orders from Morgan's treating physician, for Nurse Davis to attempt to ambulate her to
the bathroom on February 27, 2003. (R. 394.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The dispositive question for this appeal is whether the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment on Morgan's claims of medical malpractice when she did not retain
any expert to support her claims. To prevail in this lawsuit, Morgan must prove with
expert testimony that her injuries were caused by the Hospital's alleged breach of the
standard of care with expert testimony.
The requirement of expert testimony with respect to causation is clear-cut in this
case because of Morgan1 pre-existing injuries. Morgan admitted during discovery that she
has suffered with shoulder pain for many years before her alleged shoulder injury at the
Hospital occurred. As explained by Fox v. Brigham Young University, Inc., 2007 UT
App 406, 176 P.3d 446, expert testimony is required to explain whether Morgan's
shoulder injuries were caused from her prior injuries or because of the actions of a nurse
at the Hospital. Without expert testimony, a jury would be required to speculate about the
8

causes of Morgan's injuries.
Further, Morgan must prove with expert testimony the standard of care and breach
of the standard of care. The care at issue in this case — moving a post-operative cervical
spine patient as permitted by a doctor's order - is not within the common knowledge of a
lay person. Therefore, because Morgan needed experts to support her claims so she could
carry her burden of proof, and because she did not retain any experts to support her
claims, Morgan's claims fail as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err when it
granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED MORGANS CLAIMS OF
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE
MORGAN FAILED TO OBTAIN EXPERT TESTIMONY TO ESTABLISH
THAT HER INJURIES WERE CAUSED BY THE ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE OF THE HOSPITAL.
In Utah, to successfully maintain a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must

prove through expert testimony the standard of care, breach of that standard of care, and
that the injury was proximately caused by the alleged breach. See Dalley v. Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990). Utah law requires expert
testimony in nearly all medical malpractice cases because "issues of fact which are
outside the knowledge and experience of lay persons must be established by expert
testimony." Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App.
1987). If a plaintiff fails to provide expert testimony regarding a defendant's standard of
care, breach of that standard of care, and causation as to plaintiffs injuries, summary
9

judgment is appropriate. Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("A
plaintiffs failure to present evidence that, if believed by the trier of fact, would establish
any one of the three prongs of the prima facie case justifies a grant of summary judgment
to the defendant/').
In her brief, Morgan argues that because she styled one of her claims of relief as
"negligence" rather than "medical malpractice," she does not need to prove her claim with
expert testimony. (Br. of App. 30.) Specifically, Morgan argues that because "expert
testimony is not required to prove [njegligence," the trial court erred when it granted the
Hospital's motion for summary judgment based on the fact that she did not have expert
testimony to support her claims. Morgan's argument exalts style over substance.
"Whether a case is classified as ordinary negligence or medical malpractice is not
determinative of whether expert testimony is required." Cunningham v. Riverside Health
System, Inc., 99 P.2d 133, 136 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). Even when a cause of action is
styled as "simple" negligence rather than "medical malpractice," expert testimony is
necessary when medical care is at issue because the "issues of fact.. . are outside the
knowledge and experience of lay persons . . . ." Hoopiiaina, 740 P.2d dXlll.
An exception to the general requirement of expert testimony in medical malpractice
cases exists under Utah law. Utah courts have recognized that "expert testimony is
unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the
treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman."
Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980) (holding that expert testimony is not
10

required to establish negligence when a needle is left within a patient after a surgery); see
also Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Due to the technical
and complex nature of a medical doctor's services, expert medical testimony must be
presented at trial in order to establish the standard of care and proximate cause - except in
unusual circumstances.")(emphasis added). As explained by the Chadwick court, the
common knowledge exception does not remove the requirement for expert testimony to
show that the negligence at issue caused the alleged injuries if the issues of causation are
not within the common knowledge and experience of the layman. 763 P.2d at 822. "In
other words, while it may be common knowledge that a reasonable medical practitioner
would not leave a needle in a patient's body, it requires expert testimony to establish that
the lost needle is causing" plaintiffs alleged injuries. Id.
Here, Morgan did not designate a standard-of-care expert or a causation expert to
support her case. Instead, Morgan has argued that she does not need expert testimony to
meet her burden of proof because the issues in this case are within the common
knowledge and experience of the typical juror. Not only would typical jurors be unable
to understand the nursing techniques at issue in this case, but they would also be unable to
understand the issues surrounding causation in light of Morgan's prior injuries to her
shoulder and the mechanism by which such injuries occur. Without expert testimony, the
fact finder would be required to resort to speculation when making a decision on whether
the alleged negligence caused Morgan's injuries. See Fox v. Brigham Young University,
Inc., 2007 UT App 406, 176 P.3d 446; see also Cunningham, 99 P.3d at 137 ("[W]hen a
11

plaintiff has pre-existing conditions that may have caused the alleged injury, expert
testimony is necessary to show that the negligent conduct caused the injury.").
In Fox, Mrs. Fox and her husband sued Brigham Young University for negligence
and loss of consortium after she injured her knee when she descended a staircase at the
university and fell. Id. *f 2. After her fall, EMTs arrived to assist her, and they noted
obvious swelling and deformity in the plaintiffs right knee. Id. ^| 4. They also noted no
external trauma to her leg or knee, ,fsuch as scrapes or scuff marks, and that Mrs. Fox's
pants were not ripped or torn." Id. Mrs. Fox told the EMTs that she fell down "only one
stair, that she had been previously diagnosed with osteoarthritis in her right knee, and that
there was some missing cartilage in that knee." Id. \ 5.
Before trial, the University brought a motion in limine asserting that the plaintiffs'
claims failed because they did not have expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of
negligence. Id. f 8. In response, the plaintiffs admitted that they did not have expert
testimony to support their case, but that the injuries suffered by Mrs. Fox to her knee
"were within the realm of common experience" and that expert testimony was not
required. Id. \ 9. The trial court agreed with the University's position, and converted the
motion in limine to one for dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. ^ 10. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs could not sustain their burden
of proof as to causation and damages without expert testimony. Id. ^11. The trial court
explained that "it has been presented with two plausible theories of causation - failure of
an osteoarthritic knee or defective stairs - and, absent expert testimony, the court would
12

have to use speculation to choose between the two theories." Id.
On appeal, the Fox court held that the "trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Fox had
failed to prove the element of causation and her negligence claim failed as a matter of
law." Id. f 23. The Fox court explained that the "causal connection between the alleged
negligent act and the injury is never presumed and this is a matter the plaintiff is always
required to prove affirmatively." Id. f 21 (quotation and internal ellipses omitted).
"Although the question of proximate causation is generally reserved for the jury, the trial
court may rule as a matter of law on this issue if there is no evidence to establish a causal
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation." Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted). "[W]here the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond
an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding, there
must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the injury." Id. f 22
(quotation omitted). As a result, because Mrs. Fox's own admissions to the EMTs after
her injury "tied the cause of her fall to medical factors sufficiently complicated to be
beyond the ordinary senses and common experience of a layperson," and because she did
not have expert testimony to prove her prima facie element of causation, the trial court
did not err when it dismissed her case. Id. f 23.
Similarly, in this case, by her own admissions, Morgan has tied the cause of her
injury to medical factors complicated enough to be beyond the ordinary senses and
common experience of the typical juror. Morgan had shoulder surgery when her right
shoulder was previously dislocated. (R. 203-204.) Morgan told her doctor in 2001 that
13

she still suffered from pain in her right shoulder as a result of this surgery. (R. 207-208;
Morgan Add. 3-12.) Morgan also described pain in her shoulders following the
automobile accident she suffered in 1998. (R. 205-206; see also Morgan Add. 3 - 2.)
When Morgan applied for PIP benefits in June 1998, she noted that she had shoulder
pain. (R. 206.) During her deposition, Morgan also explained that she may have suffered
a fall and was kicked by a horse before she underwent back surgery at the Hospital. (R.
209-210.) When Morgan was admitted to the Hospital in February 2003 for her back
surgery, she continued to complain of pain in her shoulders before surgery, in the
recovery room and when she was admitted to the nursing floor. (R. 425.)
Because of the complex nature of shoulder injuries and the mechanism in which
they occur, as well as the fact that Morgan had preexisting shoulder problems, her treating
physicians would not offer an opinion on the cause of Morgan's injuries. For example,
while Dr. Warner, the physician who performed Morgan's back surgery, said it was
"possible" that Morgan's rotator cuffs were torn in the Hospital, he could not say it was
"probable" or "more likely than not." (R. 288.)3 Based on x-ray films of Morgan's
shoulders, he could not say that Morgan suffered her shoulder injury in late February
3

In her brief, Morgan cites to testimony from Dr. Warner to support her claim that
Nurse Davis caused her shoulder injuries. (Br. of App. 29.) The record reveals, however,
that Dr. Warner never testified that it was more probable than not that Morgan's shoulder
injuries were caused by the actions of Nurse Davis. (R. 288-289.) Instead, after stating that
he did not know the cause of Morgan's injuries, Dr. Warner engaged in speculation and
conjecture regarding the cause of her injuries. Significantly, Morgan has not argued that Dr.
Warner would support her case with expert testimony on the issues of causation and breach
of the standard of care, but instead she has consistently argued that expert testimony is not
required to support her case.
14

2003. (Id.) Along the same lines, Dr. Metcalf, who performed Morgan's shoulder
surgeries, explained that it is difficult to determine when Morgan's injuries occurred, and
said that he "couldn't tell. . . whether or not [Morgan] tore her rotator cuff last week or
five years ago." (R. 213-214.) Morgan's own testimony and the testimony of her treating
physician both show that because of the nature of her complicated shoulder injuries,
expert testimony is required to link the alleged negligent act by the Hospital's employee to
Morgan's injuries.
Morgan relies on Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9, 179 P.3d 754, to support her
argument that she does not need to provide expert testimony to be able carry the burden of
proof on her claims against the Hospital. In Bowman, the ex-husband of a deceased
patient brought medical malpractice and wrongful death claims against the patient's
psychiatrist. Id. ^ 4. The patient was killed from asphyxiation when a dresser was pulled
on top of her after she took medication from her psychiatrist that allegedly made her
clumsy. Id. ^ 2 - 3. When the plaintiff failed to provide any expert testimony on the
issue of causation, the defendant "moved for summary judgment, which the district court
granted." Id. <| 5. On appeal, the Bowman court reversed the district court's decision, and
noted that the "causal connection between a decedent made clumsy due to a doctor's
negligence, and that decedent's death due to a dresser being pulled on top of her, is not
one that requires specialized medical knowledge." Id. f 13. As a result, the Bowman
court reversed the district court, and held that the issue of causation in that case fell "with
the common knowledge exception, expert testimony is not necessary on the proximate
15

cause element." Id. % 15.
Unlike the patient in Bowman, however, Morgan suffered from pre-existing injuries
that may have caused the injuries at issue in this case and there is expert testimony from
Dr. Evans that the mechanism of the injury Morgan claims is inconsistent with the way
such injuries generally occur. Because the patient in Bowman did not suffer from preexisting conditions, the holding in Bowman is inapplicable to this case.
Instead, the trial court correctly ruled that expert testimony was required when preexisting issues are at issue based on the holding of Fox v. Brigham Young University,
Inc., 2007 UT App 406, a case that Morgan did not even cite in her opening brief, which
is curious considering that the trial court spent half of its written ruling analyzing and
applying the holding of Fox case to this case. (R. 440-444.) Therefore, because Morgan
could not provide an expert that could take the causation element of her case out of the
realm of speculation, the trial court did not err when it dismissed her claims on summary
judgment and this appeal should be summarily dismissed.
II.

MORGANS CLAIMS ALSO FAIL BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO OBTAIN
EXPERT TESTIMONY TO ESTABLISH THE STANDARD OF CARE AND
BREACH OF THE STANDARD OF CARE.
As explained above, Utah law requires expert testimony in nearly all medical

malpractice cases because "issues of fact which are outside the knowledge and experience
of lay persons must be established by expert testimony." Hoopiiaina, 740 P.2d at 271.
Also as explained above, Utah courts have recognized that "expert testimony is
unnecessary to establish the standard of care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the
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treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman."
Nixdorf, 612 P.2d at 352.
The common knowledge exception does not apply in this case. Expert testimony is
needed to establish the standard of care a nurse operates under when she must position,
move and transport post-operative cervical spine patients. According to Nurse Baldwin,
an expert retained by the Hospital, a nurse must use specialized knowledge when she
positions, moves, and transports post-operative cervical spine patients. (R. 393.) How to
move a patient shortly after spinal surgery is not the sort of knowledge a lay person would
possess. (Id.) As Nurse Baldwin explained, part of the nursing curriculum at her
university involves teaching student nurses to properly position, move and transport
patients in acute care settings. (Id.) For that reason, family members and friends are
advised not to move a patient while she is in the Hospital recovering from spinal surgery.
(Id.) Therefore, contrary to Morgan's assertions, the care at issue in this case requires
specialized medical knowledge, and Morgan must employ expert testimony to establish
the standard of care and whether the standard of care was breached.
Morgan relies on Prairie v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 698 N.E.2d 611 (111.
Ct. App. 1998), a decision from Illinois, to argue that expert testimony is not required to
establish the standard of care and breach of the standard of care in this case. (Br. of App.
23 - 30.) In Prairie, a patient underwent back surgery, and, following the surgery, the
nurse caring from the patient violated an order given by the attending physician when the
nurse moved the patient beyond what the patient could tolerate so the nurse could make
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the patient's bed. Id. at 613-614. The patient sued the Hospital based on claimed injuries
as a result of the nurse's actions. Id. at 613. While the patient was able to obtain "expert
testimony regarding . . . proximate cause," id. at 615, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant because the patient failed "to obtain expert testimony
regarding the applicable standard of care and whether it was breached by the defendant,"
id. at 613. At issue on appeal was whether the patient needed expert testimony on the
standard of care to satisfy her burden of proof in her medical malpractice case. Id. In
holding that expert testimony was not required on the issue of the standard of care, the
Prairie court "emhasizefd] that the order contained the explicit admonition that the
plaintiffs activity was to be increased 'as tolerated'." Id. at 617 (emphasis added). Based
on the fact that the nurse in Prairie acted outside the scope of a doctor's order while she
moved the patient to perform the non-medical function of making a bed, the court ruled
that expert testimony was not required to establish the standard of care and breach of the
standard of care, but instead these issues could be properly left to the jury because they
were in the common knowledge of a lay person. See generally id.
The case here differs from the Prairie case on two important points. First, unlike
the Prairie case, Morgan has not retained an expert to establish the causation element of
her case. Second, unlike the nurse whose care was at issue in Prairie, the nurse caring for
Morgan did not act outside the scope of a doctor's order. Morgan's attending physician
entered an order that Morgan had no restrictions on her activity. (R. 422, 423.) The
nurses were also ordered to present Morgan for physical therapy on the day Morgan
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alleges she was injured. (Id.) While expert testimony may not be needed to determine the
standard of care when a nurse acts outside the scope of a doctor's order while moving a
patient recovering from surgery, courts recognize that expert testimony is required to
establish the standard of care when a nurse assists a patient following surgery in
compliance with a doctor's order. See Cunningham, 99 P.3d at 138.
In Cunningham, the plaintiff, Cunningham, sued a hospital, Riverside, alleging that
a nursing assistant "negligently twisted Cunningham's leg while assisting her into bed,
causing her femur to break." Id. at 135-136. At the time of the incident, Cunningham
was recovering from knee surgery, and was also diagnosed with "advanced degenerative
joint disease" and "severe osteoarthritis" Id. After Cunningham failed to obtain medical
expert testimony to support her claims, Riverside moved for summary judgment, and the
trial court granted this motion. Id. On appeal, the Cunningham court affirmed the trial
court's decision. While Cunningham argued that moving a patient does not require
specialized knowledge and that she did not need expert testimony to establish the standard
of care and breach of the standard of care, the Cunningham court disagreed, and held that
expert testimony was required to prove not only causation, but also the appropriate
standard of care, based in part on the fact "that the nurse's assistant was positioning
Cunningham's immobilized leg in accordance with her doctor's recommendations for
healing." Id at 135.
Here, the knowledge required by Nurse Davis to move Morgan while she was
recovering from back surgery is not within the common experience of a layperson,
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especially when Nurse Davis acted within the scope of orders issued by Morgan's
attending physician. (R. 422, 423.) Accordingly, expert testimony is necessary for
Morgan to prevail on her claims against the Hospital, and the trial court did not err when
it dismissed Morgan's claims on summary judgment after she did not name any experts
that could support her case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Hospital respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
decision of the trial court.
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